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Abstract
Should a country invest more in human or physical capital? The present paper addresses
this issue, considering the impact of different factor intensities between sectors on both optimal
human and physical capital accumulation. Using a two-sector overlapping generations setting
with endogenous growth driven by human capital accumulation, we prove that relative factor
intensity between sectors drastically shapes the welfare analysis: two laissez-faire economies
with the same global capital share may generate physical capital excess or scarcity, with respect
to the optimum. The model for the Japanese economy, that experienced a factor intensity
reversal after the oil shock, is then calibrated. It is shown that Japan invested relatively too
much in human capital before 1975, but has not invested enough since 1990. .
Keywords: Endogenous growth, social optimum, two-sector model, factor intensity differential
JEL Classification Number : E20; H52; O41
1 Introduction
Over the past 25 years, access to higher education has increased whereas household saving has
fallen sharply. Chand (2008) draws attention to this question explaining the decline in the saving
rate as a result of a trade-off between physical and human capital accumulation. The model we
propose allows the relative significance of physical capital accumulation vis-a`-vis human capital
accumulation to be considered from a different perspective. We adopt an optimal view point,
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seeking to establish whether the relative significance of physical capital accumulation vis-a`-vis
human capital accumulation is efficient.
The optimal amount a country should invest in human or physical capital is usually ana-
lyzed through a basic aggregated one-sector framework, even though economists agree that this
approach is too restrictive to describe the production process. Representing the whole economy
through a one-sector structure does not allow sectoral differences and relative price adjustments
between sectors to be considered. Empirical evidence suggests that sectoral relative prices vary
(Hsieh and Klenow (2007)), especially between rich and poor economies. Valentinyi and Herren-
dorf (2008) also show that factor intensity is sector-dependent in the US economy. Zuelta and
Young (2012) emphasize that the US labor income share within the agricultural and manufactur-
ing sector fell between 1958 and 1996 whereas it increased in the service sector. This means that
the apparent stability of the US global labor share hides contrasted evolutions of sectoral labor
shares.
In a recent study, Takahashi et al. (2012) measure the capital intensity difference between
consumption and investment goods sectors in the post-war Japanese economy and in other main
OECD countries. Before the 1973 oil shock, the Japanese investment sector was capital intensive.
They observe a capital intensity reversal after the oil shock, with the consumption sector becom-
ing capital intensive compared to the investment sector. They suggest that a capital intensive
investment sector in Japan before 1973 may explain the high speed growth observed over this
period, as suggested by the Rybczynski theorem1. A rise in physical capital endowment increases
production in the investment goods sector more than in the consumption goods sector. As the
investment sector produces physical capital, this leads to a magnification effect.2 According to
Takahashi et al. (2012), a one-sector framework fails to account for this phenomenon. Conse-
quently, considering the one-sector aggregated model to describe the economy as a whole may
bias the analysis and leads to some properties that a two-sector approach may capture being
ignored.
We depart from the Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) overlapping generations (OLG) model in-
troducing a two-sector two-factor production structure a` la Galor (1992). In this model, growth
is driven by human capital accumulation. We distinguish between a consumption and an “in-
vestment” sector which use both human and physical capital. In this specific setting, the good
produced in the investment sector is used for education spending and investment. Due to the
two-sector structure, the relative price between the two goods plays a crucial role in the factor
allocation between sectors. As a result, it matters both for human capital accumulation and for
1The theorem states that a rise in the endowment of one factor will lead to a more than proportional expansion
of the output in the sector which uses that factor intensively, at constant relative goods price.
2Unlike Japan, in other OECD countries, the consumption sector is capital intensive. There is neither a
magnification effect nor capital intensity reversal.
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economic growth. We analyze optimal physical and human capital accumulations and explain
how these allocations depend on sectoral characteristics.
Our paper considers the literature on optimal balanced path in OLG models with human capital
(Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007)). It also addresses a second strand of lit-
erature dealing with optimal path and efficiency in a two-sector framework (e.g., Uzawa (1964)or
Cremers (2006)). Most papers using a two-sector model of endogenous growth with human and
physical capital accumulation consider only a final good sector - producing a good which can
either be consumed or invested in physical capital - and an education sector [Bond et al. (1996),
Mino et al. (2008)]3.
A contribution of this paper is to fully characterize the socially optimal balanced growth path
in a two-sector framework with paternalistic altruism. The first-best optimum is defined by a
social planner who maximizes the discounted sum of utility of all future generations. We prove
that the sectoral differences in terms of capital intensities become crucial to characterize the social
optimum. We develop a setting where the average capital share is constant, whereas sectoral cap-
ital intensities in the two sectors may change. Consider two laissez-faire (LF) economies with the
same characteristics, except for relative factor intensities. These economies may generate physical
capital excess or scarcity, with respect to the optimum, even if the global factor share is identical
between these two countries. In a one-sector model, the sectoral capital intensities differential
would be ignored: optimal factor accumulation would be the same for these two economies.
We define a Relative Factor Accumulation (RFA) reversal as a situation where a change in
sectoral capital intensities makes the optimal global capital intensity higher (lower) than the LF
when it was initially lower (higher) than the LF. For example, in a country where the optimal
global physical to human capital ratio is lower than the LF, an optimal policy would favor human
capital investment. If sectoral changes lead to an RFA reversal - which means that the optimal
global physical to human capital ratio becomes higher than the competitive one - the optimal
policy would be to favor physical capital accumulation. We emphasize that such RFA reversal
may arise depending on the level of individuals’ impatience. Then, to achieve the first-best, the
government should consider a relationship between these sectoral capital intensities and the time
preference, which does not exist in a one-sector setting. To sum up, relative capital intensity
between sectors is crucial to determine the scheme of optimal policy.
The model for Japan is calibrated and we find that it experiences an RFA reversal between
1970 and 2000, due to sectoral changes. In our model, such a reversal affects the design of optimal
policy. Based on the analysis of sectoral capital intensities, the model predicts that Japan did
not invest enough in education when the consumption sector was capital intensive compared to
3Bond et al. (1996) use a continuous-time model and Mino et al. (2008) use a discrete-time model with
infinitely-lived agents. To our knowledge, in the literature, the two-sector two-factor formalization with education
sector and final good sector is not used in the OLG model with education spending.
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the investment sector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the theoretical model.
Section 3 is devoted to the planner’s solution. In Section 4, we compare optimal and laissez-faire
solutions. In Section 5, we propose a calibration of the model for Japan. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The production structure
We consider an economy producing a consumption good Y0 and a capital good Y1. Each
good is produced using physical capital Ki and human capital Hi, with i = {0, 1}, through a
Cobb-Douglas production function. The representative firm in each industry faces the following
technology:
Y0 = A0Kα00 H
1−α0
0 (1)
Y1 = A1Kα11 H
1−α1
1 (2)
α1, α0 ∈ (0, 1) A1 > 0, A0 > 0
Full employment of factors holds so that, K0t + K1t = Kt, and H0t + H1t = Ht, where Kt and
Ht are respectively the total stock of physical capital and the aggregate human capital at time t.
We denote the physical to human capital ratio in sector i by ki = Ki/Hi, and the share of human
capital to sector i, hi = Hi/H and obtain:
y0 = A0kα00 ; y1 = A1k
α1
1 (3)
h0k0 + h1k1 = k, h0 + h1 = 1 (4)
First order conditions give
wt = (1− α1)A1kα11t = P0t(1− α0)A0kα00t (5)
Rt = α1A1kα1−11t = P0tα0A0k
α0−1
0t (6)
where wt represents the wage, Rt the rental rate of capital, and P0 the relative price of the
consumption good in terms of the investment good. From (5) and (6), we derive the physical to
human capital ratios as functions of the price of the consumption good:
k0t = B
(
α0(1−α1)
α1(1−α0)
)
(P0t)
1
α1−α0
k1t = B(P0t)
1
α1−α0
with B =
(
α0
α1
) α0
α1−α0
(
A0
A1
) 1
α1−α0
(
1−α1
1−α0
) α0−1
α1−α0
(7)
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In this model, there are as many mobile factors as sectors, so that factor returns depends only
on the relative price and do not depend on the global capital intensity k.
For simplicity, we assume a complete depreciation of the capital stock within one period, then:
Kt+1 = It.
2.2 Household’s behavior
The economy is populated by finitely-lived agents. In each period t, N persons are born, and
they live for three periods. Following Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), we consider a paternalistic
altruism whereby parents value the quality of education received by their children. In their first
period of life, agents benefit from education. In their second period of life, when adult, they are
endowed with ht+1 efficiency units of labor that they supply inelastically to firms. Their income
is allocated between current consumption, saving and investment in children’s education. As we
assume no population growth, we normalize the size of a generation to N = 1. In their third
period of life, when old, agents retire. They consume the proceeds of their savings.
The preferences of a representative agent born at time t − 1 are represented by a log-linear
utility function:
U(ct, dt+1, ht+1) = (1− β) ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln ht+1 (8)
0 < β < 1 ; 0 < γ < 1
where β/(1 − β) is the psychological discount factor, γ the degree of altruism, ct and dt+1 cor-
respond respectively to adult and old aggregate consumption, and ht+1 child’s human capital.
Parents devote et to their children’s education. Human capital in t+ 1 is given by:
ht+1 = bet (9)
Notice that even if there is no explicit externality in our simple human capital production func-
tion, grandparents’ expenditure in education generate a positive intergenerational external effect.
Indeed, parents decide for their child’s education but do not consider the impact of this decision
on their grandchild’s human capital. The more educated children are, the more they earn when
adults and invest in their own children’s education.
An agent born at date t − 1 maximizes his utility function over his life cycle, with respect to
budget constraints and human capital accumulation function :
max
st,et
U(ct, dt+1, ht+1) = (1− β) ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln ht+1
s.t wtht = P0tct + st + et (a)
stRt+1 = P0t+1dt+1 (b)
ht+1 = bet (c)
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First order conditions give the optimal education et, and the optimal saving st:
et =
γ
1 + γwtht (10)
st =
β
1 + γwtht (11)
2.3 Equilibrium
Since the size of the working age population is equal to one, the effective labor supply at
time t is Ht = ht. The clearing condition in the capital market is Kt+1 = st, and as by defintion
Kt+1 = kt+1Ht+1, we have:
kt+1 =
st
ht+1
(12)
Using (9), (10), (11) and (12), we obtain the equilibrium physical to human capital ratio
which is constant over time.
kt+1 =
β
bγ
= k (13)
The consumption market clearing condition in period t is:
ct + dt = Y0t
ct + dt = A0k0tα0h0tht
(14)
We define the growth rate as the growth rate of human capital:
1 + gt =
ht+1
ht
(15)
To highlight the impact of sectoral differences, we formulate this assumption:
Assumption 1 Let ε be the factor intensity differential between consumption and investment
sectors: ε = α0 − α1.
Therefore, when ε tends to zero, we have two identical sectors. And the larger ε is, the larger
will be differences between sectors. Hereafter, we focus on the Balanced Growth Path (BGP).
Definition 1 A Balanced Growth Path is an equilibrium path along which all variables grow at
the same rate, that is the per-unit-of-effective-labor variables are constant.
We can now characterize the economy’s growth rate:
Lemma 1 On the balanced growth path, the growth rate is
1 + g = γ(1 + γ)bA1w (16)
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with
w = (1− α1)kα11
and
k1 =
β
bγ(1− α1)
α1(1 + γ)(1− α1 − ε)
ε(1− β) + α1(1 + γ) (17)
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
The equilibrium growth rate depends on the degree of altruism γ and on the psychological factor
β, in the same way as in Michel and Vidal (2000).4 In a two-sector framework, it is also shaped
by the spread between sectoral factor intensities ε, through the wage.
Proposition 1 For α1 given, when ε increases the competitive growth rate goes down.
Indeed, at α1 given, the return on human capital is a decreasing function of ε. A rise in ε (or in
α0, when α1 is given) leads to a decrease in the marginal productivity of human capital of the
consumption sector. Combining (5) and (6), we have
1− α1
α1
k1 =
1− α0
α0
k0 (18)
A rise in ε shifts human capital from the consumption to the investment sector: capital intensity
decreases in the investment sector and so does the wage. As a result, the wage is lower in an
economy where the consumption sector is capital intensive (ε > 0), and so is the growth rate.
When the investment sector is capital intensive (ε < 0), the higher ε (in absolute value), the
higher the growth rate. Conversely, when the consumption sector is capital intensive (ε > 0), the
higher ε, the lower the growth rate. Notice that this feature of our endogenous growth model is
consistent with Takahashi et al. (2012), who show that the investment good sector was capital
intensive with respect to the consumption good sector (ε > 0) during the high speed growth
period in Japan.
3 The social planner’s problem
The social planner adopts a utilitarian viewpoint5, and maximizes the discounted sum of all
future generations’ utilities while allocating output between the different activities. The max-
imization is subject to the clearing conditions on both good markets, the human capital accu-
mulation equation, and the full employment of resources. In this two-sector setting, the planner
has to allocate both capital stocks between the two sectors at the initial period (t = 0). We
thus have two additional constraints with respect to the one sector case, corresponding to the full
4Growth rate is an increasing function of β and an increasing and then decreasing function of γ.
5See, Davin, Gente and Nourry (2012).
7
employment of resources at time 0. The planner’s program is then given by:
max
ct,dt,K0t,K1t,H0t,H1t,K0t+1,K1t+1,H0t+1,H1t+1
∞∑
t=−1
δt ((1− β) ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln ht+1) (19)
subject to: ∀t > 0 A0Kα00t H1−α00t = ct + dt
A1K
α1
1t H
1−α1
1t = et +Kt+1
ht+1 = bet
Kt = K0t +K1t
ht = H0t +H1t
K0 = K00 +K10
h0 = H00 +H10
K0, h0, and c−1 given
We make use of the method of the infinite Lagrangian to characterize the optimal solution. The
Lagrangian expression can be written as:
L = δ−1((1− β) ln c−1 + (1− β) ln d0 + γ ln h0) +
∞∑
t=0
δt ( (1− β) ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln ht+1) +
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
q0t
(
A0K
α0
0t H
1−α0
0t − ct − dt
)
+ q1t
(
A1K
α1
1t H
1−α1
1t −
H0t+1 +H1t+1
b
−K0t+1 −K1t+1
))
(20)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount factor, reflecting the social planner’s time preference, q0 and q1
are multipliers associated with the resource constraints in both sectors.
We denote by a superscript asterisk (*) the optimal solution. The maximum of L with respect
to ct, dt, K0t, K1t, H0t, H1t, K0t+1, K1t+1, H0t+1, and H1t+1, is reached when the following
conditions are fulfilled for t > 0:
c∗t =
(1− β)
q∗0t
; d∗t =
β
δq∗0t
(21)
δq∗0t+1α0A0k
∗
0t+1
α0−1 = q∗1t (22)
δq∗1t+1α1A1k
∗
1t+1
α1−1 = q∗1t (23)
δq∗0t+1(1− α0)A0k∗0t+1α0 =
q∗1t
b
− γ
h∗t+1
(24)
δq∗1t+1(1− α1)A1k∗1t+1α1 =
q∗1t
b
− γ
h∗t+1
(25)
q∗00α0A0k
∗
00
α0−1 = q∗10α1A1k∗10
α1−1 (26)
q∗00(1− α0)A0k∗00α0 = q∗10(1− α1)A1k∗10α1 (27)
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A0k
α0
0t
∗h∗0th
∗
t = c∗t + d∗t (28)
A1k
∗
1t
α1h∗1th
∗
t = h∗t+1
(1
b
+ k∗0t+1h∗0t+1 + k∗1t+1h∗1t+1
)
(29)
Transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞ δ
tq∗1tK
∗
t+1 = 0, limt→∞ δ
tz∗t h
∗
t+1 = 0 (30)
where z∗ is the shadow price of human capital.
For initial conditions c−1, K0, h0 and for all t > 0 an optimal solution is defined as satisfying
equations (21) to (30).6
Eliminating shadow prices from the first order conditions (FOC) and rearranging the terms, we
obtain conditions that characterize optimal solutions. From the FOC (21), sectoral implicit prices
must equal the marginal utility of consumption. The intertemporal allocation of consumption
between the two goods is thus obtained:
βc∗t = δ(1− β)d∗t (31)
Optimal allocation is such that, worker’s marginal utility for consumption and retired person’s
marginal utility for consumption - discounted by the factor δ - are the same.
From (21), (22) and (26), we obtain the optimal growth rate of consumption in t+ 1:7
c∗t+1
c∗t
− 1 = k
∗α0−1
0t+1
k∗α0−10t
δα1A1k
∗α1−1
1t − 1 (32)
We analyze the optimal solution along the BGP and derive the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Along the BGP, welfare is maximized according to the modified golden rule, δf ′(k∗1) =
1 + g∗. There exists a unique unstable steady state equilibrium k∗1 :
k∗1 =
α1
b(1− α1)
S + δγ(1− α1)
S + γ(1− δα1) (33)
with S = ((1− β)δ + β)(ε(δ − 1) + 1− α1)) > 0. Moreover, ∂g∗∂γ > 0, ∂g
∗
∂ε > 0 and
∂g∗
∂β < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
The optimal growth rate corresponds to the modified golden rule in the investment good sector.
Due to the decreasing returns in physical capital accumulation, there is a negative relationship
6Since the problem is concave, these first order conditions (FOC) are sufficient.
7Integrating equation (21), we have c
∗
t+1
c∗
t
= q
∗
0t
q∗0t+1
. With (22) and (23) we obtain, c
∗
t+1
c∗
t
= q
∗
1t
q∗0t+1
α1A1k
∗
1t
α1−1
α0A0k∗0t
α0−0 .
Then, with (22) we deduce (32).
9
between the optimal growth rate g∗ and sectoral factor intensity k1 and k0.8 According to the
expression of S, the optimal value k∗1 decreases with γ and rises with β since δ < 1. The more
altruistic individuals are, the higher the optimal level of human capital and the lower the ratio
k∗1. Thus, when preferences for human capital go up the optimal growth rate increases. When
β goes up the agent becomes more patient. To improve his future consumption he has to invest
in physical capital, which is the only way to smooth consumption. As a result, the physical to
human capital ratio increases in both sectors and the optimal growth rate goes down. We recover
the competitive equilibrium: a negative relationship between ε and k∗1, (for a given α1). Thus,
the central planner implements the modified golden rule and the growth rate decreases with k∗1.
To sum up, for α1 given, when ε increases the optimal growth rate is higher.
Using the equilibrium in the investment sector (29), along the BGP we have:
h∗1 =
(1 + g∗)(1b + k∗)
A1k1
∗α1 (34)
From equations (4), (22) to (25)9, and (34), we can write k∗ as a function of k∗1 and obtain the
following global physical to human capital ratio:
k∗ = b(ε+ α1)(1− α1)k
∗
1 − δα1ε
α1b((1− α1) + ε(δ − 1)) (35)
Through equations (2), ( 34) and (35) it can be seen that optimal capital intensity (k∗), and
optimal factor allocation between sectors (k∗1 and h∗1) depend on ε. The optimal ratio k∗ is an
increasing function of ε. As a result, a change in the spread between sectoral factor intensities
affects the optimal allocation of factors between sectors and the optimal factor accumulation.
4 Laissez-faire and the social optimum
We are interested in the trade-off between investment in education and investment in physical
capital. More precisely, we consider the role of the two-sector feature on this trade-off. The
physical to human capital ratio, k, is an indicator of the relative physical to human capital
investment in the economy. Indeed, the higher k∗ the more the government has to invest in
physical capital relative to human capital. We know from the previous section that the optimal
ratio k∗ is affected by the relative factor intensity differential ε. As mentioned in the Introduction,
empirical studies show that an apparent constant average factor share may hide sectoral factor
share (α0 and α1) changes. Let us consider the average capital share α¯ = (α0 + α1)/2, and the
deviation from this average, Υ, with Υ ∈ [max{−α¯, α¯ − 1} ; min{α¯, 1 − α¯}]. As a result, the
8Along the BGP, growth rate is given by 1 + g∗ = δA1α1k1∗α1−1, hence it is decreasing in k∗1 . Using equations
(22) to (25), we can express the growth rate as 1 + g∗ = δA1α1
(
k0
∗ α1(1−α0)
α0(1−α1)
)α1−1
, hence it is decreasing in k∗0 .
9Equations (22) to (25) gives the standard relationship k
∗
1t+1
k∗0t+1
=
( 1−α0
1−α1
)
α1
α0
.
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consumption and investment sector physical capital share are respectively given by α0 = α¯ + Υ
and α1 = α¯ − Υ, and the factor intensity differential is given by ε = 2Υ. This section aims to
examine how changes in sectoral factor shares affect the ratio k∗, whereas the average capital
share remains the same. We obtain the optimal physical to human capital ratio k∗ as a function
of Υ:
Lemma 3 The physical to human capital ratio at the first-best as a function of Υ is given by:
k∗ = (α¯+ Υ(1− 2δ)) [Υ(ψ(2δ − 1) + δγ) + (1− α¯)ψ] + δγ [(1− α¯)α¯−Υ(1 + α¯(1− 2δ)]
b [Υ(ψ(2δ − 1) + δγ) + (1− α¯)ψ + γ(1− δα¯)] (1− α¯−Υ(1− 2δ)) (36)
where ψ = ((1− β)δ + β).
Moreover, ∂k∗/∂Υ > 0 (resp. < 0) when β < β˜ (resp. β > β˜), with : β˜ = δ((2δ − 1) + γ)/(2δ −
1)(δ − 1).
Proof. see Appendix 7.3.
This Lemma underlines the non-trivial effects of sectoral factor share movements on the ag-
gregate physical to human capital ratio. In an economy where agents are impatient (β low), an
increase in capital intensity in the consumption sector (Υ > 0) raises the optimal physical capital
accumulation even when the capital intensity in the investment sector decreases. Conversely,
when the consumption sector becomes more intensive in human capital (Υ < 0), it is optimal to
increase human capital accumulation relatively to physical capital investment. This means that
when the weight that agent gives to future consumption is sufficiently low, the changes in the
consumption sector have a more substantial impact on the optimal factor accumulation than the
changes in the investment sector. We observe the opposite result when agents value their future
consumption more (β high), i.e, the effect of changes in the investment sector prevails over those
in the consumption sector.
Due to externalities, the relative physical to human capital ratio in the decentralized econ-
omy, given by (13), differs from the first-best. The positive externality in education entails
an under-accumulation of human capital in laissez-faire, whereas we can observe under- or over-
accumulation of physical capital. As a result, depending on β, the competitive ratio k may be
higher or lower than the first-best k∗. A higher (lower) optimal capital intensity than the compet-
itive one means that there is an under-accumulation (over-accumulation) of physical capital. In
this case, optimal policy should favor investment in infrastructure (education) rather than in ed-
ucation (infrastructure). Regarding the optimal and laissez-faire physical to human capital ratio,
the relative importance of factor accumulation may switch, and we can formulate the following
definition:
Definition 2 There is a relative factor accumulation (RFA) reversal, when the sign of the term
K = k∗ − kLF changes.
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From equations (13) and (36), we know that K ≡ K (Υ, β).
For simplicity’s sake, we formulate this assumption, as relevant for a developed economy:
Assumption 2 α¯ < 1/2, thus Υ ∈ [−α¯ ; α¯].
Using Lemma 3 and Definition 2, we compare the RFA at the optimum and the laissez-faire,
according to sectoral factor intensity changes:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, there exist two critical bounds β¯1 and β¯2 such that:
i) For β¯1 < β¯2 < β˜: When β < β¯1, optimal physical to human capital ratio is always higher than
the laissez-faire. When β¯1 < β < β¯2, ∃ Υ characterizing RFA reversal. When β > β¯2, optimal
physical to human capital ratio is always lower than the laissez-faire.
ii) For β˜ < β¯2 < β¯1: When β > β¯1, competitive physical to human capital ratio is always
higher than the first-best. When β¯2 < β < β¯1, ∃ Υ characterizing RFA reversal. When β < β¯2,
competitive physical to human capital ratio is always lower than the first best.
Proof. see Appendix 7.4
Proposition 2 provides conditions for the existence of an RFA reversal generated by sectoral
changes. The results are depicted by Figure 1 which represents K.
Υ
K
0
K(Υ, β¯1)
K(Υ, β¯2)
α¯−α¯
6
ﬀ -
i) β < β˜
Υ
K
0
K(Υ, β¯2)
K(Υ, β¯1)
α¯−α¯
6
ﬀ -
ii) β > β˜
Figure 1: Gap between the optimal and the laissez-faire physical to human capital ratio
Figure 1 allows three regimes in each case to be distinguished. Consider the first case, i). When
agents are impatient, such as β < β¯1 < β¯2 < β˜, the optimal physical to human capital ratio is
higher than the laissez-faire, whatever the relative factor intensity between sectors (ε).10 In this
case, sectoral factor share movements do not lead to an RFA reversal. When β¯1 < β < β¯2 < β˜,
the optimal ratio may be higher or lower than the laissez-faire depending on the factor intensities
differential between sectors. In a country where the consumption sector is relatively more capital
intensive, the optimal policy would favor physical capital relative to human capital investment.
Indeed, the higher ε, the more likely is under-accumulation of physical capital. Conversely, in
a country with a consumption sector that is human capital intensive, the optimal policy would
10As ε = 2Υ, we can interpret the results in terms of factor intensity differential between sectors.
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favor human capital investment. Lastly, for a lower degree of time preference (β high), such that
β¯1 < β¯2 < β < β˜, the agent accumulates too much physical capital relative to human capital,
and hence, there is no RFA reversal. We obtain opposite results in the case ii).
The results of Proposition 2 are due to the fact that optimal physical and human capital accu-
mulation depend on the two-sector structure. Thus, considering a two-sector model with human
and physical capital, we emphasize an important result: when countries experience a factor in-
tensity reversal, as was the case in the postwar Japanese economy, the scheme of optimal capital
accumulation may be affected.
We can formulate the following corollary, which gives indications about optimal policy allowing
to achieve the first-best optimum:
Corollary 1 i) For β¯1 < β < β¯2 < β˜: ∃ Υ¯, such that if Υ > Υ¯ (resp. Υ < Υ¯ ) it is efficient to
invest relatively more (resp. less) in physical capital.
ii) For β˜ < β¯2 < β < β¯1: ∃ Υ¯, such that if Υ > Υ¯ (resp. Υ < Υ¯ ) it is efficient to invest relatively
more (resp. less) in human capital.
5 Discussion: the Japanese case
In a recent paper, Takahashi et al. (2012) measure the capital intensities in the investment
and consumption sectors in Japan. They notice a capital intensity reversal after the 1973 oil
shock. Indeed, before 1973, the Japanese economy characterized by a relatively capital intensive
investment sector, whereas the consumption sector was capital intensive after the oil shock.
Using their computations, we calibrate our model to emphasize the existence of an RFA reversal
in Japan, generated by changes at sectoral level. We assume that each period has a length of
30 years. Following Evans and Sezer (2004), estimation for the yearly discount factor for Japan
is 0.985 and corresponds to β is 0.39.11 The social discount factor δ is 0.95.12 We calibrate the
scale parameter in the human capital accumulation function, b, such that the sectoral capital
intensities (k0 and k1) match the ones computed by Takahashi et al. (2012) (see, Table 1). The
altruism factor drives human capital accumulation and so the growth rate of the economy. For
more robustness, we consider two possible scenarios: γ = 0.45 and γ = 0.65.
Data in Table 1 come from Takahashi et al. (2012) (for k0, k1, k), and the present author’s
computations (for α1, α0, α¯, Υ, ε). Using equations (3), (18) and sectoral data, we determine
capital share in both sectors and average capital share in 1955. Then, we compute for each year
the sectoral capital share considering equation (18) and α0 = α¯+ Υ and α1 = α¯−Υ, in order to
compute Υ.
Using Lemma 3, Proposotion 2, Table 1 and calibrations for δ, β and γ, we obtain the following
critical bounds:
11According to Evans and Sezer (2004), the pure time preference rate r is 1.5%. Thus, the discount factor is
given by
( 1
1+r
)30 = 0.639, which corresponds in our model to β/(1− β). Hence we get β = 0.39.
12Based on the Ramsey formula (1928), Evans and Sezer (2004) estimate the social time preferences rate at 5%
for Japan. Thus, the social discount factor δt is given by (1/1, 05)t.
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1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
k0 0,8378 1,1166 1,8020 2,9716 4,7794 6,5399 8,8666 12,5774 16,6877 18,1378
k1 1,0361 1,2171 2,0187 3,4760 4,8492 6,2347 8,5745 11,2214 14,8834 18,3598
α1 0,4065 0,3917 0,3949 0,4000 0,3832 0,3759 0,3776 0,3681 0,3680 0,3829
α0 0,3565 0,3714 0,3681 0,3630 0,3798 0,3872 0,3855 0,3950 0,3950 0,3801
α¯ 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815 0,3815
Υ 0,0000 -0,0102 -0,0134 -0,0185 -0,0017 0,0056 0,0040 0,0135 0,0135 -0,0014
ε -0,0501 -0,0203 -0,0268 -0,0370 -0,0034 0,0113 0,0079 0,0269 0,0270 -0,0029
Source: Takahashi et al. (2012) and the present author’s computations
Table 1: Data for Japanese Economy
Parameters Values
β˜ -32.72
β¯1 1.7123
β¯2 0.0073
Υ¯ -0.0013
Table 2: Critical bounds for γ = 0.65
In accordance with Lemma 3, Proposition 2, and Table 2, k∗ is decreasing with Υ in Japan and
there is an RFA reversal when Υ¯ = −0.0013. As a result, from 1955 to 1975, optimal physical to
human capital ratio was too high in Japan, whereas the opposite was true after 1975.
Υ
0
K(0.39)
Υ¯=-0.0013
α¯−α¯
6
-
1955 to1975
2000
1980 to 1995
Figure 2: Japanese case
Two sources of inefficiency are likely to interact in an OLG model with both human and
physical capital. A positive intergenerational externality in education and inefficiencies in physical
capital accumulation. As a result, a physical to human capital ratio lower than the first best can
be due to under-accumulation of human capital and/or over-accumulation of physical capital.
Whatever the case, our calibrations stress that Japan should have invested more intensively in
education from 1980 to 1995 (see figure 2). We examine whether Japanese economic policy was
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Figure 4: Gross domestic savings (% of
GDP)
Source: The World Bank
in line with the optimal solution. We focus on the relative factor accumulation and thus analyze
the government’s intervention in education relative to domestic saving, which determines physical
capital accumulation. The evolution of public education spending and gross domestic saving in
Japan from 1970 to 2000 is considered.
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Figure 5: Ratio of public expenditure on education over domestic saving
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show that from 1970 to 1985, public education spending went up and saving
went down, reducing the physical to human capital ratio. This policy was not optimal between
1970 and 1975, because the ratio is already lower than the first-best. From 1975 to 1985, policy
seems qualitatively appropriate as the optimal ratio is lower than the laissez-faire. We notice
that public education expenditure fell sharply in the early 1990s. Moreover, it decreased more
strongly than saving whereas our model highlights that it would have been optimal to encourage
public education spending. Indeed, during this period, relative capital intensity between sectors
continues to increase in favor of the consumption sector, hence the negative spread between the
optimal and the laissez-faire physical to human capital ratio goes up and has to be offset by
a more intensive education policy. As a result, considering sectoral differences, we assert that
Japanese policy was not optimal.
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6 Conclusion
The unbalanced nature of industry factor shares highlights how crucial it is to consider at
least two-sector models to design optimal policy. Indeed, whereas an aggregated model hides the
difference in factor intensities across sectors, a multi-sector model allows such characteristics to be
taken into account. In this paper, we develop a two-sector model and we underline the importance
of factor intensities differences to design an optimal balanced growth path and optimal policy.
We conclude that changes in sectoral factor shares may imply a relative factor intensity reversal
and thus affect the optimal accumulation of human and physical capital. A factor intensity
differential between sectors should then be considered to determine the scheme of optimal policy.
We have shown that the two-sector model is tractable enough to conduct such an analysis. Our
calibrations for the Japanese economy illustrate our results.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From the consumer budget constraints (a) and (b) and equations (10) and (11), we have:
P0tct = wtht
1− β
1 + γ (37)
P0t+1dt+1 = Rt+1
(
β
1 + γwtht
)
(38)
Substituting these last expressions in the consumption goods market equilibrium (14) gives:
1
(1 + γ) (wtht(1− β) +Rtβwt−1ht−1) = P0tA0k0t
α0hth0t (39)
We divide this expression by ht and substitute (10) for ht−1:
1
(1 + γ)
(
wt(1− β) +Rt β
bγ
(1 + γ)
)
= P0tA0k0tα0h0t (40)
As full employment of factors holds, we have k1h1 + k0h0 = k. From (4) this can be written:
k1(1− h0) + k0h0 = k ⇒ h0 = k − k1
k0 − k1 (41)
Including (41) in equation (40) we obtain:
1
(1 + γ)
(
wt(1− β) +Rt β
bγ
(1 + γ)
)
= P0tA0kα00t
kt − k1t
k0t − k1t
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According to (13) for t > 0, kt+1 = kt = k. Using (7) and (13):
1
(1+γ) (wt(1− β) +Rtk(1 + γ)) =
P0tA0
(
α0(1−α1)
α1(1−α0)
)α0
Bα0(P0t)
α0
α1−α0
 k−k1t
B(P0t)
1
α1−α0
(
α0−α1
α1(1−α0)
)

fixing D ≡ (α0(1−α1))α0 (α1(1−α0))1−α0α0−α1 :
1
(1 + γ) (wt(1− β) +Rtk(1 + γa)) = P0tA0Dk1t
α0−1(k − k1t)
We replace P0t using (7) and factor returns by (5) and (6):
1
(1+γ)
(
(1− α1)A1k1tα1(1− β) + α1A1k1tα1−1k(1 + γ)
)
= k1tα1−α0
Bα1−α0 A0Dk1t
α0−1(k − k1t)
with D
Bα1−α0 =
(α0(1−α1))α0 (α1(1−α0))1−α0
(α0−α1)
(
α1
α0
)α0 (A1
A0
) (
1−α0
1−α1
)α0−1 ≡ (1−α1)α1(α0−α1) A1A0
As a result, the physical to human capital ratio in the investment good sector, k1, is constant
and we finally obtain, for t > 0:
k1 = k
α1
1− α1
(1− α1)− (α0 − α1)(
1
1+γ
)
(1− β)(α0 − α1) + α1
To express the equilibrium growth rate, we use (15) with (9) and (10):
1 + gt =
γ
1 + γ bAwt
As equilibrium physical to human capital ratio is constant at secotral level, from (5), the return
of human capital is constant as well. We have wt = wt+1 = w, hence we obtain a balanced growth
path along which the variables chosen by agents (st, et, ct and dt+1) grow at the same constant
rate as individual human capital, g.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Using equations (28) and (29) at time t+1, and the relationship h∗i = H∗i /H∗ (with i = {0, 1}),
gives:
A1k
∗α1
1t+1H
∗
1t+1 −
h∗t+2
b
− k∗1t+2H∗1t+2 − k∗0t+2H∗0t+2 = 0 (42)
and
A0k
∗α0
0t+1H
∗
0t+1 − c∗t+1 − d∗t+1 = 0
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Integrating (31) in the last equation, we can write:
H∗0t+1 =
c∗t+1
A0k
∗α0
0t+1
ψ (43)
with ψ =
(
(1−β)δ+β
(1−β)δ
)
.
Using FOC (23) and (25), we obtain the following relationship:
h∗t+1 =
1
q∗1t
(
γbα1
α1 − (1− α1)k∗1t+1b
)
(44)
At each time, h = H1 +H0. Considering this relation, we can rewrite (42):
A1k
∗α1
1t+1(h∗t+1 −H∗0t+1)−
h∗t+2
b
− k∗1t+2(h∗t+2 −H∗0t+2)− k∗0t+2H∗0t+2 = 0
and substitute h∗t+1 and h∗t+2 from equation (44) and H∗0t+1 and H∗0t+2 from equation (43). We
obtain :
A1k
∗α1
1t+1
[
1
q∗1t
(
γbα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+1b
)
− c
∗
t+1
A0k
∗α0
0t+1
ψ
]
= 1q∗1t+1
(
γα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+2b
)
+k∗1t+2
[
1
q∗1t+1
(
γbα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+2b
)
− c
∗
t+2
A0k
∗α0
0t+2
ψ
]
+ c
∗
t+2
A0k
∗α0
0t+2
ψ
Simplify by q∗1t+1 and using equations (21) to (23) we have:
k∗1t+1
δ
(
γb
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+1b
)
− k
∗
1t+1
k∗0t+1
(1− β)α0α1ψ =(
γα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+2b
)
+ k∗1t+2
(
γbα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+2b
)
− k
∗
1t+2
k∗0t+2
δ(1− β)α0ψ + δ(1− β)α0ψ
(45)
From (22) to (25), optimal solution satisfies the equality of the marginal rate of transformation
between the two sectors:
(1− α1)A1k∗1t+1α1
α1A1k∗1t+1
α1−1 =
(1− α0)A0k∗0t+1α0
α0A0k∗0t+1
α0−1
Thus, we obtain the following relationships between k∗0t+1 and k∗1t+1:
k∗1t+1
k∗0t+1
=
(1− α0
1− α1
)
α1
α0
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Introduce it in (45) gives:
k∗1t+1
δ
(
γb
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+1b
)
−
(
1−α0
1−α1
)
(1− β)ψ =(
γα1
α1−(1−α1)k∗1t+2b
) (
1 + k∗1t+2b
)− (1−α01−α1) δ(1− β)α1ψ + δ(1− β)α0ψ (46)
We have a dynamic equation in k∗1. We differentiate it in order to study the stability of the
equilibrium:
γb(α1−(1−α1)k∗1b+(1−α1)bk∗1)
δ(α1−(1−α1)k∗1b)2 dk
∗
1t+1 =
γα1(b(α1−(1−α1)k∗1b)+(1−α1)b(1+k∗1b))
(α1−(1−α1)k∗1b)2 dk
∗
1t+2
After simplifications:
bα1
δ
dk∗1t+1 = α1b(α1 + (1− α1))dk∗1t+2
dk∗1t+2
dk∗1t+1
= 1
δ
> 1 (47)
According to (47), the stationary capital ratio given by the first best solution is unstable. There-
fore, after one period, the economy jumps to the balanced growth path characterized by the
optimal physical to human capital ratio k∗1.
We then compute the optimal physical to human capital ratio in the investment sector along the
BGP. From Definition 1, it is characterized by k∗1t+2 = k∗1t+1 = k1∗. We simplify equation (46)
and obtain:
γ
α1−(1−α1)k∗1b
(
k∗1b−α1δ−k∗1bδα1
δ
)
= δ(1− β)ψ
(
α0 − α1 1−α01−α1
)
+ (1− β)ψ
(
1−α0
1−α1
)
From (44), h∗ exists only when k∗1 > α1/b(1− α1). Therefore, we can write:
γk∗1b(1− δα1)− γδα1 =
δ(1− β)ψ
1− α1 (δ (α0 − α1) + (1− α0))(α1 − (1− α1)k
∗
1b) (48)
Equation (48) leads to:
γ(1− δα1)k∗1b+ Sk∗1b = γδα1 + S
(
α1
1− α1
)
where S = δ(1− β)ψ(δ(α0 − α1) + (1− α0))
Therefore, we have an expression for k∗1 given by (33).
From Definition 1 and (32) the optimal growth rate along the BGP is given by:
1 + g∗ = δα1A1k∗α1−11
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This corresponds to the two-sector modified golden rule as 1 + g∗ = δf ′(k1).
Using equation (33) we compute the following derivatives:
∂k∗1
∂γ
= δ − 1
δb(1− α1)2
S
(γ(1− δα1) + S)2 < 0 ⇒
∂g∗
∂γ
> 0
∂k∗1
∂β
= α1γ(1− δ)
2
b
(1− α0) + δ(α0 − α1)
(γ(1− δα1) + S)2 > 0 ⇒
∂g∗
∂β
< 0
∂k∗1
∂ε
= − α1
b(1− α1)
ψγ(1− δ)2
(S + γ(1− δα1))2 < 0 ⇒
∂g∗
∂ε
> 0
Lemma 2 follows.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We establish equation (36) from (35), substituting ε = 2Υ and α1 = α¯ − Υ. The derivative
with respect to Υ is:
∂k∗
∂Υ =
−(ψ + γ)(ψ(2δ − 1) + δγ)
(ψΥ(2δ − 1) + ψ(1− α¯) + γ(1− δα¯) + δγΥ)2
The sign of this derivative is given by the term -(ψ(2δ − 1) + δγ). Including the expression of ψ,
∂k∗
∂Υ > 0 when β(2δ− 1)(δ− 1)− δ((2δ− 1) + γ) > 0. We deduce the properties of k∗(Υ) given in
Lemma 3.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We compare the optimal and the laissez-faire physical to human capital ratio. The laissez-
faire ratio is given by (12) and the optimal by (36).
According to Lemma 3, we have two possible cases:
• When β < β˜, k∗ is increasing in Υ. We examine k∗(Υ) at the limits of its definition set:
k∗(−α¯) = 2δα¯b(1−2δα¯) and k∗(α¯) = 2(β(1−δ)+δ)(1−δ)α¯b(γ+(2α¯(δ−1)+1)(β(1−δ+δ)) .
Comparing to the laissez-faire ratio, we have k∗(−α¯) < kLF if β > γ2δα¯(1−2δα¯) ≡ β¯1 and,
respectively, k(−α¯) > kLF when β < β¯1. In the second case, we have kLF < k∗ ∀ Υ, as the
function k∗ is increasing in Υ. Consider the case β > β¯1, we have k∗(α¯) > kLF under the
following condition:
−β2(1− δ)(2α¯(δ − 1) + 1) + β
[
γ(2α¯(1− δ)2 − 1) + δ(2α¯(1− δ)− 1)
]
+ 2γδα¯(1− δ) > 0
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This polynomial in β admits a unique positive solution β¯2 such that when 0 < β < β¯2, we
have k∗(α¯) > kLF . Respectively, when β > β¯2, we have k∗(α¯) < kLF . The expression of β¯2
is given by:
β¯2 =
(1− δ)2α¯((1− δ)γ + δ)− δ − γ +√∆
2(1− α¯)(1 + 2α¯(δ − 1))
With ∆ = (1− δ)2α¯((1− δ)γ + δ)− δ − γ − 4(1− δ)2δγα¯(1− 2α¯(1− δ)).
When β¯1 < β < β¯2, there exists a critical level Υ¯ such that kLF = k∗, with:
Υ¯ = ψβ(α¯− 1) + βγ(δα¯− 1) + α¯γ(ψ + δγ)2ψδ(β + γ)− ψ(β + γ) + δγ(β + γ)
• When β > β˜. Likewise, we obtain the opposite compared to the previous case. Ratio k∗ is
decreasing in Υ, thus, when β > β¯1, kLF > k∗ ∀ Υ. Conversely when β < β¯2, k∗ > kLF ∀
Υ. In this case, we have β¯2 < β¯1.
Proposition 2 follows.
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